British Journal of Social Psychology (1994), 33, 1–27 *Printed in Great Britain*

The role of stereotyping in system-justification and the production of false consciousness

John T. Jost* and Mahzarin R. Banaji*

Department of Psychology, Yale University, PO Box 208205, Yale Station, New Haven, CT 06520-8205, USA

Although the concept of justification has played a significant role in many social psychological theories, its presence in recent examinations of stereotyping has been minimal. We describe and evaluate previous notions of stereotyping as *ego-justification* and *group-justification* and propose an additional account, that of *system-justification*, which refers to psychological processes contributing to the preservation of existing social arrangements even at the expense of personal and group interest. It is argued that the notion of system-justification is necessary to account for previously unexplained phenomena, most notably the participation by disadvantaged individuals and groups in negative stereotypes of themselves, and the consensual nature of stereotypic beliefs despite differences in social relations within and between social groups. We offer a selective review of existing research that demonstrates the role of stereotypes in the production of false consciousness and develop the implications of a system-justification approach.

> [T]he rationalizing and justifying function of a stereotype exceeds its function as a reflector of group attributes—G. W. Allport (1958, p. 192).

The concept of justification, in the sense of *an idea being used to provide legitimacy or support for another idea or for some form of behaviour*, has played a prominent role in social psychological theorizing. The notion that people will justify some state of affairs, to themselves and to others, has been explicit or implicit in psychoanalytic theory (Freud, 1946), social comparison theory (e.g. Festinger, 1954; Suls & Wills, 1991), cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957; Wicklund & Brehm, 1976), self-perception theory (Bem, 1972), attribution theory (e.g. Heider, 1958; Jones, Kanouse, Kelley, Nisbett, Valins & Weiner, 1972; Kelley, 1967), self-presentation theory (e.g. Jones, 1964; Schlenker, 1980), theories of human reasoning (e.g. Nisbett & Ross, 1980; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974), just-world theory (Lerner, 1980), social identity theory (e.g. Hogg & Abrams, 1988; Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 1986), and self-affirmation theory (Steele, 1988). Empirical research has demonstrated that people seek explanations or justifications for, *inter alia*:

(a) social events (e.g. Brickman, 1987; Hastie, 1984; Hewstone, 1989; McClure, 1991; McLaughlin, Cody & Read, 1992; Tajfel, 1981*a*, *b*)

(b) their own thoughts, feelings, and behaviours (e.g. Aronson & Mills, 1959; Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959; Greenwald, 1980; Marshall & Zimbardo, 1979; Monson & Snyder, 1977; Schachter & Singer, 1962; Schwarz & Clore, 1988, Scott & Lyman, 1968; Zanna & Rempel, 1988; Zillman, 1978)

*Requests for reprints

(c) aggressive or discriminatory behaviours (e.g. Bandura, 1983; Bar-Tal, 1989, 1990; Brock & Buss, 1964; Lifton, 1986; Martin, Scully & Levitt, 1990; Scully & Marolla, 1984; Staub, 1989; Sykes & Matza, 1957)

(d) their status or position (e.g. Chaikin & Darley, 1973; Gerard, 1957; Janoff-Bulman, 1992; Kipnis, 1976; Miller & Porter, 1983; Ross, Amabile & Steinmetz, 1977; Sampson, 1969; Sidanius, 1993).

(e) the status or position of others (e.g. Cialdini, Kenrick & Hoerig, 1976; Darley & Gross, 1983; Eagly, 1987; Eagly & Steffen, 1984; Hoffmann & Hurst, 1990; Howard, 1984; Lerner, 1980; Pepitone, 1950; Ross *et al.*, 1977; Ryan, 1971; Sampson, 1969; Sidanius, 1993; Stotland, 1959)

(f) the aggressive or discriminatory acts of other in-group members (e.g. Bar-Tal, 1989, 1990; Hogg & Abrams, 1988; LaPiere, 1936; LaViolette & Silvert, 1951; Struch & Schwartz, 1989; Tajfel, 1978, 1981*a*, *b*)

(g) prevailing social conditions (e.g. Bem & Bem, 1970; Blumenthal, Kahn, Andrews & Head, 1972; Campbell & LeVine, 1968; Howard & Pike, 1986; Kahn, 1972; Kluegel & Smith, 1986; Lerner, 1980; Samuelson & Zeckhauser, 1987; Sidanius, in press; Sidanius & Pratto, 1993; Tetlock, 1992; Tyler, 1990; Tyler & McGraw, 1986).

Indeed, the second half of the 20th century in social psychology may well be remembered as an era of research on justification. We point out the extensive attention to the concept of justification in order to note its striking absence in theory and particularly in research on stereotyping.

In this paper, we review previous work on *ego-justification* and *group-justification*[1] and build on them to propose a third category of justification which we term *system-justification*. Briefly stated, ego-justification refers to the notion that stereotypes develop in order to protect the position or behaviour of the self (e.g. Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson & Sanford, 1950; Katz & Braly, 1935; Lippmann, 1922). Group-justification views assume that stereotyping emerges in the service of protecting not just the individual ego, but the status or conduct of the social group as a whole (e.g. Hogg & Abrams, 1988; Huici, 1984; Tajfel, 1981*a*, *b*). While both views are important and useful, they each leave some key issues unaddressed. Chief among these is the phenomenon of negative stereotyping of the self or the in-group, and the degree to which stereotypes are widely shared across individuals and social groups. In response to these issues, we propose that the concept of system-justification is necessary to address adequately the social functions of stereotyping (cf. Sidanius & Pratto, 1993).

System-justification is the psychological process by which existing social arrangements are legitimized, even at the expense of personal and group interest. In this paper, the concept of system-justification is meant to bring into prominence the degree to which stereotypes emerge and are used to explain some existing state of affairs, such as social or economic systems, status or power hierarchies, distributions of resources, divisions of social roles, and the like (cf. Ashmore & Del Boca, 1981; Eagly & Steffen, 1984; Hoffman & Hurst, 1990; Schaff, 1984; Snyder & Miene, 1994; Sunar, 1978). Stereotypes, which are widespread beliefs about social groups, are hypothesized to accompany any system characterized by the separation of people into roles, classes, positions, or statuses, because such arrangements tend to be explained and perceived as justifiable by those who participate in them.

[1] Another distinct approach to stereotyping began in the 1970s, focusing on the cognitive mechanisms that account for stereotyping (see Hamilton, 1981; Hamilton & Trolier, 1986). The cognitive approach to stereotyping represented a rejection of individual motivation as the cause of stereotyping, demonstrating instead that much stereotyping occurred as a result of biases in cognition, especially in the operation of perception and memory. In so doing, this research demystified the concept of stereotyping and resulting prejudice by: (*a*) detaching it from a lingering interpretation in terms of ego-justification and the accompanying emphasis on prejudiced personalities; (*b*) aspiring to map out the information-processing constraints which lead to stereotyping; and (*c*) demonstrating the pervasive nature of stereotyping among ordinary people in addition to the special populations of interest to ego-justification theories. We do not evaluate most of that research here because it has not explicitly addressed the issue of justification in stereotyping. However, we will draw on some recent research in social cognition to build support for the system-justification view.

Central to this discussion is the concept of false consciousness, defined here as the holding of beliefs that are contrary to one's personal or group interest and which thereby contribute to the maintenance of the disadvantaged position of the self or the group (cf. Cunningham, 1987; Eagleton, 1991; Elster, 1982; Meyerson, 1991). Examples might include 'accommodation to material insecurity or deprivation' (Parkin, 1971, p. 90), developing 'needs which perpetuate toil, aggressiveness, misery, and injustice' (Marcuse, 1964, p. 5), deriving a 'kind of comfort from believing that [one's] sufferings are unavoidable or deserved' (Wood, 1988, p. 359), and thinking that 'whatever rank is held by individuals in the social order represents their intrinsic worth' (McMurtry, 1978, p. 149). By drawing on the concept of false consciousness, we postulate a system-justification function for stereotyping in addition to the previously recognized functions of ego- and group-justification. More specifically, it is argued that under some circumstances, stereotypes that serve to justify an existing state of affairs will operate even at the expense of individual or collective self-interest.

The purpose of this paper is to address the relationship between stereotyping and false consciousness. After identifying the contributions and limitations of the ego- and group-justification approaches, we review support for the system-justification view. From experimental social psychology we select evidence to show that individuals generate beliefs about themselves and stereotypes about social groups in such a way that existing situations are justified. From recent research on the unconscious *modus operandi* of stereotyping (cf. Banaji & Greenwald, 1994), we discuss the possibility that stereotypic justifications may operate implicitly. The unconscious nature of system-justification may allow existing ideologies to be exercised without the awareness of perceivers or targets.

The ego-justification approach

Walter Lippmann (1922) is generally credited with importing the term 'stereotype' into the social sciences (e.g. Ashmore & Del Boca, 1981; Brigham, 1971; Fishman, 1956; LaViolette & Silvert, 1951). While Lippmann (1922) emphasized the cognitive functions of simplification and categorization which are served by the stereotype, he also posited a motivational function:

> There is another reason, besides economy of effort, why we so often hold to our stereotypes when we might pursue a more disinterested vision. The systems of stereotypes may be the core of our personal tradition, *the defenses of our position in society* (p. 95, emphasis added).

In other words, Lippmann argued that individuals stereotype because it justifies their personal status or conduct in relation to others. This assumption that stereotypes serve to

justify the behaviour of individuals figured prominently in the early social psychological literature (e.g. Adorno *et al.*, 1950; Allport, 1954; Katz & Braly, 1933, 1935). For instance, Katz & Braly (1935, p. 182) wrote that: 'Group prejudices are rationalizations by which the individual maintains his self-esteem and advances his economic and other interests'. Similarly, Allport (1958, p. 187) claimed that the main function of the stereotype is 'to justify (rationalize) our conduct in relation to' other social categories. What is common to all of these accounts (and, we argue, partially responsible for their failure) is the suggestion that stereotyping is employed for exploitative purposes and, in particular, as a personal defence or rationalization of exploitation.

The notion that stereotypes serve ego-justification functions continued to influence researchers adopting a 'functional approach', especially those influenced by psychoanalytic perspectives on stereotyping and prejudice (e.g. Adorno *et al.*, 1950; Bettelheim & Janowitz, 1964; Katz, 1960; Myrdal, 1944; Smith, Bruner & White, 1956). Following Freud (1946), these writers proposed that stereotyping served as a 'defence mechanism' whereby internal conflicts were projected onto societal scapegoats. Although many such accounts reconciled the Freudian view with sociological approaches (e.g. Adorno *et al.*, 1950), the ego-defensive hypothesis with respect to stereotyping was criticized for its 'far-reaching lack of interest in the influence of the social environment on the individual' (Bettelheim & Janowitz, 1964, p. 50). The function of ego-justification, however allur-ing, failed to produce satisfactory empirical evidence and was rejected along with social psychology's rejection of psychoanalysis more generally (see Sherif & Cantril, 1947) even before modern alternatives to conceptualizing attitude and stereotype function became available.

While researchers have returned to the study of the functions of attitudes, and to a much lesser extent, of stereotypes (e.g. Herek, 1984, 1986; Shavitt, 1989; Snyder & DeBono, 1989; Snyder & Miene, 1994), ego-justification remains among the least studied of the functions. Nevertheless, there are occasional findings which support Lippmann's (1922) hypothesis that stereotypes are used by the advantaged as 'defenses of [their] position in society' (p. 95). For instance, Ashmore & McConahay (1975) report that the probability of stereotyping poor people as lazy and therefore deserving of their plight is correlated positively with one's socio-economic status, which suggests that those occupying high positions in society need to justify themselves by denigrating others who are less fortunate. It has also been observed that aggressive actors may justify their own behaviour through a stereotypic process of 'delegitimization' whereby their victims are denied human status, as when soldiers refer to the enemy as 'savages' or 'satanic' (e.g. Bar-Tal, 1989, 1990). Indeed, functional theorists continue to address the motiva-tional gains made by stereotypers in their efforts to justify their own status and behaviour (e.g. Herek, 1986; Snyder & Miene, 1994; Sunar, 1978), and some marxist theorists also have suggested that ego-justification may be 'required to explain how people doggedly sustain such superficial and anti-human views as racism and sexism' (cf. Adorno *et al.*, 1950; Cunningham, 1987, p. 259). By contrast, we argue for a system-justification view of stereotyping whereby the attribution of role-specific traits arises not out of individual motivations but results from information processing in an ideological environment.

There are several ways in which the ego-justification hypothesis is incomplete. First, and perhaps most importantly from our standpoint, ego-justification cannot account for the many documented cases of negative self-stereotyping whereby disadvantaged group

members subscribe to stigmatizing stereotypes about their own group and about them-selves (e.g.Allport, 1954; Bettelheim & Janowitz, 1964; Brown, 1986; Clark & Clark, 1947; Gergen, 1969; Giles & Powesland, 1975; Gregor & McPherson, 1966; Lambert, Hodgson, Gardner & Fillenbaum, 1960; Lewin, 1941; McNaught, 1983; Millet, 1970; Pettigrew, 1964; Sarnoff, 1951; Williams & Morland, 1979). While the phenomenon of 'self-hate' has a chequered past in the social sciences, and many methodological and empirical challenges have been raised against it (e.g. Banks, 1976; Crocker & Major, 1989; Greenwald & Oppenheim, 1968; Hraba & Grant, 1970; Katz & Zalk, 1974; Porter & Washington, 1989; Rosenberg, 1989; Turner & Brown, 1978), researchers continue to observe negative self-stereotyping among many low-status groups whose opportunities for effective collective advancement are severely limited (e.g. Aboud, 1988; Bernat & Balch, 1979; Broverman, Vogel, Broverman, Clarkson & Rosenkrantz, 1972; Corenblum & Annis, in press; Fine & Bowers, 1984; Jahoda, Thompson & Bhatt, 1972; Milner, 1981; Peterson & Ramirez, 1971; Tajfel, 1982; Vaughan, 1978). Clearly, if such evidence can be trusted to demonstrate the frequent if not ubiquitous character of negative self-stereotyping, it would seem to exhaust the explanatory capacities of ego-justification theories, since it hardly seems self-serving to denigrate oneself on stereotypic dimensions.

A second, related weakness of ego-justification approaches is that often people stereo-type in the absence of any personal behaviour or status requiring justification. For instance, many people subscribe to negative stereotypes of groups with whom they have never inter-acted and therefore would have no conduct to rationalize (e.g. Diab, 1962; Katz & Braly, 1933; Prothro, 1954). Similarly, disadvantaged groups frequently have negative stereo-types of one another, although neither is in a relative position of high status that would seem to require defence, as in the case of 'working-class racism' (e.g. Willhelm, 1980).

Thirdly, stereotypes are characterized by their consensuality, the fact that they are shared by large segments of society (e.g. Allport, 1954; Ehrlich, 1973; Fishman, 1956; Katz & Braly, 1933; Tajfel, 1981*a*, *b*). For example, Triandis, Lisansky, Setiadi, Chang, Marin & Betancourt (1982) found that hispanics and blacks had approximately the same stereotypes of one another that whites had of them. If the contents of stereotypes arose out of processes of individual justification, as the ego-justification hypothesis suggests, it seems unlikely that they would be so uniformly shared, since individuals should vary on the dimension in need of rationalization. We will return to this issue of consensuality in our discussion of the group-justification approach to stereotyping.

The group-justification approach

Tajfel (1981*b*) is well known for having argued that stereotyping ought to be considered in the context of group interests and social identity. More specifically, he postulated that stereotypes serve to justify actions of the in-group, 'committed or planned', against out-groups. In other words, Tajfel expanded the initial ego-justification hypothesis to the level of intergroup relations, an endeavour that was begun by Allport (1954) and others (e.g. Cox, 1948; LaPiere, 1936, LaViolette & Silvert, 1951; Sherif & Sherif, 1956). Similar group-based functions have been proposed by others under the rubrics of 'social integra-tion' (e.g, Schaff, 1984) and 'social adjustment' (Katz 1960; Smith, Bruner & White, 1956; Sunar, 1978), terms which are meant to emphasize the degree to which the in-group consolidates itself in order to distinguish itself from other groups.

The work of Tajfel and colleagues may be viewed as initiating a second wave of attention to the 'justification' function of stereotypes, culminating in the insight that stereotypes serve intergroup functions of rationalizing or justifying the in-group's treatment of the out-group (e.g. Condor, 1990; Hogg & Abrams, 1988; Huici, 1984; Tajfel, 1981*a*, *b*). Furthermore, in-group members are expected to employ negative stereotypes of the out-group in an attempt to differentiate their group from others, that is, by making comparative social judgements that benefit the in-group relative to the out-group (e.g. Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 1986; Turner, 1975). Social identity theory is referred to as a 'conflict theory' because it assumes that groups in society must compete with one another for symbolic and material resources, and that they will develop stereotypes of other groups in an effort to justify their competition (Billig, 1976; Hogg & Abrams, 1988). Experiments cited on behalf of the notion that groups use stereotypes to positively differentiate themselves from other groups include Hewstone, Jaspars & Lalljee (1982), Wagner, Lampen & Syllwasschy (1986), and Spears & Manstead (1989), although the support is not as strong as one might expect. Nevertheless, virtually every recent review of the literature has accepted Tajfel's assumption that people are motivated to hold positive stereotypes of the in-group and negative stereotypes of the out-group (e.g. Ashmore & Del Boca, 1981; Bar-Tal, 1989; Bar-Tal, Graumann, Kruglanski & Stroebe, 1989; Brewer & Kramer, 1985; Dovidio & Gaertner, 1986; Hamilton, 1981; Hamilton & Trolier, 1986; Hewstone & Giles, 1986; Hogg & Abrams, 1988; Howard & Rothbart, 1980; Huici, 1984; Jussim, Coleman, & Lerch, 1987; Maass & Schaller, 1991; Messick & Mackie, 1989; Mullen, Brown & Smith, 1992; Stephan, 1985; Wilder, 1986; Worchel & Austin, 1986).

By expanding the concept of ego-justification from protection of the self to include protection of the extended self, Tajfel's group-justification view overcomes several difficulties faced by Lippmann, Katz, Allport, and others. For instance, an individual may subscribe to certain stereotypes not necessarily to justify some personal conduct or social position, but as a way of defending the actions of others with whom he or she shares a social identification. Thus, people could possess stereotypes of groups whom they as individuals had never encountered, but whom other members of their group had encountered (cf. Gergen, 1969). In addition, social identity theory's emphasis on competition between groups helps to explain why disadvantaged groups would promulgate negative stereotypes of one another. Although neither group could be said to occupy a privileged position in need of defence or justification, as Lippmann, Katz & Braly, and others emphasized, both groups may make psychological gains by comparing themselves favourably to other groups near in status to them (e.g. Tajfel, 1978).

The notion that stereotypes emerge within the context of group behaviour also helps to explain why stereotype contents are more uniform than would be predicted on the basis of the ego-justification hypothesis alone. According to Hogg & Abrams (1988, p. 75), the 'sharedness is due to a *social* process of social influence which causes conformity to group norms'. In other words, social identity theory states that stereotypes are consensual because all members of the social group are expected to follow them so as to establish collective justifications for intergroup behaviour. However, this does not explain why stereotypes are consensual *across* groups—why members of different social groups often possess the same stereotypes of a certain group, despite the fact that their intergroup relationships are not the same. For example, it has been found that men and women subscribe to similar gender stereotypes (e.g. Ashmore & Del Boca, 1986; Banaji & Greenwald, 1994; Banaji, Hardin & Rothman, 1993; Basow, 1986; Broverman *et al.*, 1972; Howard, 1984; McKee & Sherriffs, 1956), and whites and blacks also possess similar racial stereotypes (e.g. Bayton, McAlister & Hamer, 1956; Katz & Braly, 1933; Sagar & Schofield, 1980). In addition, Triandis *et al.* (1982) reported that whites, blacks, and hispanics did not differ in the stereotypes that they had of one another, despite the significant status differences among these groups in the United States. One of the earliest and most dramatic conclusions of the stereotyping literature was that stereotypes of specific nationalities were widely shared by different groups, even across cultures (e.g. Diab, 1962; Gergen, 1969; Katz & Braly, 1933; Prothro, 1954). Researchers, too, have reported considerable cross-cultural generality with regard to gender stereotypes (e.g. Basow, 1986; Ward, 1985; Williams & Best, 1982).

Condor (1990, pp. 236–7) criticizes social identity theorists for taking the consensuality of stereotypes to be an *'a priori* assumption' without saying why different groups should subscribe to the same stereotypes. We argue that social identity theory's ability to account for phenomena such as the societal (or cross-societal) consensuality of stereotype contents is indeed limited. A complete theory would need to address the concept of ideological domination (to explain the social processes by which knowledge is created and disseminated by those in power) and evidence from psychological accounts of false consciousness (to explain the cognitive mechanisms by which such knowledge is learned and used) in order to understand why members of disadvantaged groups adhere to norms and justifications that are not in their interest.

While the social identity perspective does accommodate the phenomenon of self-stereotyping, defined as the tendency of an individual to categorize himself or herself in terms of group membership (e.g. Hogg & Turner, 1987; Lorenzi-Cioldi, 1991; Oakes & Turner, 1990; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher & Wetherell, 1987; Turner, Oakes, Haslam & McCarthy, 1992), it does not account for the phenomenon of *negative* self-stereotyping, which we raised in the discussion of ego-justification approaches. For example, the female subjects in the Broverman *et al.* (1972) study actually evaluated their own group negatively by endorsing stereotypic items such as 'irrational', 'passive', and 'incompetent' (but see Widiger & Settle, 1987). While Eagly & Mladinic (1994) and others are correct to point out that stereotypes of women are positive in many respects, it is important to recognize that negative stereotypes of the in-group (and positive stereotypes of the out-group) are at odds with the function of group-justification.

There is also some evidence for in-group devaluation on stereotypic dimensions provided by studies using social identity theory's own empirical paradigm. Spears & Manstead (1989), for instance, found that students from Manchester University rated the typical Oxford University student to be more 'hard-working', 'self-assured', 'articulate', and 'intellectually minded' than the typical Manchester student. Even if such differences were validated by objective criteria such as grades and test scores or if they were widely believed by most of society, one might expect subjects to defend the in-group 'at all costs', in the words of Hogg & Abrams (1988, p. 76).

In a recent meta-analytic review by Mullen *et al.* (1992) including 77 laboratory tests of the hypothesis that experimental or *ad hoc* groups would evaluate the in-group more favourably than the out-group, the authors conclude that there is a statistically reliable but moderately sized tendency to favour the in-group. Although Mullen *et al.* make

little mention of out-group favouritism among low-status groups, Jost (1993) reorganized the studies they cited according to the type of bias exhibited (in-group, out-group, or none) and found that a full 85 per cent of low-status groups made trait evaluations favouring the higher-status out-group, while none of the high-status groups showed out-group favouritism. The paper by Mullen *et al.* (1992) therefore underestimates the degree to which low-status group members express preferences for the out-group in experimental situations, possibly reflecting a type of false consciousness. While the signs of out-group favouritism disappear in Mullen *et al.*'s review of the data for 'real'-world groups, who manifest in-group bias more generally, such groups can provide only imprecise evidence about the operation of theoretically specified variables. The reasons for the 'interaction' between status and type of group (laboratory or 'real') are far from clear, perhaps reflecting greater patterns of social desirability among real-world respondents (see Jost, 1993).

A growing number of writers have noted that social identity theory currently does not account for the phenomenon of 'out-group favouritism' (e.g. Apfelbaum, 1979; Dittmarr, 1992; Hewstone & Jaspars, 1984; Hinkle & Brown, 1990; Jost, 1993; Kalmuss, Gurin & Townsend, 1981; Sidanius, 1993; Sidanius & Pratto, 1993). Hinkle & Brown (1990), for instance, argue that:

> Out-group favouritism *per se* does not fit with [social identity theory's] view that group members create and maintain positive social identities by engaging in in-group favouring processes of intergroup comparison (p. 49).[2]

Social identity theory alone does not possess a ready account of phenomena such as negative stereotyping of the in-group, although issues relevant to it have been discussed in the literature (e.g. Tajfel, 1982; Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 1986; Turner & Brown 1978; van Knippenberg, 1978, 1984).

At times, the social identity or self-categorization perspective clearly seems to suggest that the individual is motivated to form positive stereotypes of the in-group (e.g. Hogg & Abrams, 1988; Turner *et al.*, 1987), and at other times that stereotypes of the in-group will reflect the group's position in society, whether positive or negative (e.g. Hogg & Turner, 1987; Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 1986). For example, Hogg & Abrams (1988, p. 76) write that 'there is a vested interest in preserving the evaluative superiority of the ingroup at all costs', whereas Hogg & Turner (1987, p. 31) state that 'the precise form taken by the self-stereotyping [ethnocentric, ambivalent, or deprecatory] will only be predictable from knowledge of the relations' between the groups. This ambiguity can perhaps be traced to social identity theory's on-again/off-again relationship to concepts of ideology and false consciousness (cf. Apfelbaum, 1979; Condor, 1990). The theory seems to acknowledge that powerless groups will often internalize the norms of powerful out-groups, but it also predicts that the powerless groups will develop their *own* norms in

[2] It is interesting to note that Tajfel & Turner (1979, 1986) originally raised the phenomenon of out-group favouritism among subordinate groups in order to criticize 'realistic conflict theory' as defended by Sherif, Campbell, and others. Social identity theory was offered in order to account for negative social identity among disadvantaged groups, but mainly to propose that there are psychological pressures for these groups to improve their situation by challenging established hierarchies. The theory holds that disadvantaged individuals are highly motivated to overcome the effects of the existing social system and that they are frequently successful at it (e.g. Hogg & Abrams, 1988; Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 1986; Turner & Brown, 1978). This view may underestimate the extent to which ideological domination is possible and the degree to which members of disadvantaged groups persist in explaining and justifying the social order which creates their oppression.

order to achieve positive distinctiveness. Even if social identity theory is not incompatible with phenomena such as negative self-stereotyping and out-group favouritism (e.g. Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Turner & Brown, 1978), it does not seem to possess a mechanism to account for them in the way that a need for positive social comparison is capable of accounting for positive stereotyping of the in-group and negative stereotyping of out-groups (e.g. Hinkle & Brown, 1990; Hogg & Abrams, 1988).

Social identity theorists attempt to resolve the ambiguity between the hypothesis of group-justification and the finding of out-group favouritism among disadvantaged groups under the rubric of perceived 'legitimacy' and 'stability' of the system, or the extent to which group members are able to conceive of 'cognitive alternatives' to the current state of affairs (Tajfel, 1982; Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 1986; Turner & Brown, 1978). With respect to social stereotyping, this factor has been conceptualized as the 'consensuality' of the stereotype, that is, the degree to which its content is undisputed or widely accepted as valid (e.g. Spears & Manstead, 1989; van Knippenberg, 1984). In other words, social identity theory supposes that when negative images of the in-group are seen as both legitimate and unlikely to change, disadvantaged groups may internalize harmful stereotypes of themselves; when these stereotypes, however, are perceived as unfair or open to change, in-group favouritism will prevail once again and negative stereotyping of the in-group will disappear (e.g. Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Thus, Spears & Manstead (1989) found that Manchester students acknowledged the superiority of Oxford students on consensually accepted dimensions such as 'hard-working' and 'intellectually minded', but evaluated the in-group more positively than the out-group on traits such as 'practically minded', 'easygoing', and 'aware of trends in music and fashion'. The system-justification approach would suggest that the traits on which subordinate groups positively differentiate themselves actually may serve to reinforce the *status quo*, by creating stereotypes whereby less advantaged groups are seen by themselves and others as accommodating or content ('easygoing') or not particularly concerned with achievement ('interested in music and fashion'). Perceptions concerning the stability and legitimacy of the *status quo* or the consensuality and validity of stereotypes may be symptoms of what we call 'system-justification'.

We argue that justification of the *status quo* frequently appears to outweigh the individual's defence of group interests. In cases such as these, negative stereotyping of the in-group seems to serve the function of justifying an unequal state of affairs, even at the expense of personal and group interest (cf. Sidanius & Pratto, 1993). For this reason and others, we postulate a third system-justifying function for the stereotype which is consistent with the idea of false consciousness and is supported by theory and data from experimental social psychology.

The system-justification approach

The time is at hand for social psychology to address a third view of justification whereby stereotypes are documented as serving ideological functions in addition to or, better, frequently in opposition to, motivational functions associated with personal or group defence. In postulating that stereotypes serve the function of 'system-justification', we do not seek to displace previous theories of justification, but rather to build on them in order to account for ignored or unexplained phenomena. Just as Turner and his colleagues argue

that the individual may move back and forth from personal categorization to group categorization (e.g. Oakes & Turner, 1990; Turner *et al.*, 1987; 1992), we suggest that the individual will sometimes adopt a 'system-justifying' stance whereby an existing state of affairs is preserved 'at all costs'. Incidentally, we do not claim that system-justification accounts for the formation and maintenance of all stereotypes, only that many stereotypes serve for their adherents the function of preserving the *status quo*.

We seek to develop the argument that stereotypes serve ideological functions, in particular that they justify the exploitation of certain groups over others, and that they explain the poverty or powerlessness of some groups and the success of others in ways that make these differences seem legitimate and even natural. This position is consistent with a large body of social psychological research which finds that 'one of the most commonly observed characteristics of social existence is that people imbue social regularities with an "ought" quality' (Lerner, 1980, p. 10). Based on theories of and data on self-perception, attribution, cognitive conservatism, the division of social roles, behavioural confirmation, and the belief in a just world, we stipulate a process whereby stereotypes are used to explain the existing social system and the positions and actions of self and others. This notion, as we have said, is not new. The resistance-to-change view underlies broad-scale social philosophies such as marxism and feminism as well as psychological accounts of cognitive conservatism, confirmation biases, and implicit stereotyping.

Because the ideas of the dominant tend to become the ideas of the dominated (e.g. Kluegel & Smith, 1986; MacKinnon, 1989; Marcuse, 1964; Marx & Engels, 1846; Mason, 1971), system-justifying stereotypes may be advanced by even those who stand to lose from them. The system-justification approach addresses issues of false consciousness more directly than approaches emphasizing ego- or group-justification, since the former stipulates that under certain conditions people will justify the *status quo* at all costs, above and beyond the desire to justify their own interests or the interests of other group members. Theorists adopting a social dominance perspective (e.g. Sidanius, 1993; Sidanius & Pratto, 1993) have drawn attention to these same ideological processes in terms of 'legitimizing myths' that serve to justify the oppression of some groups by others. While Sidanius and Pratto also claim that unequal social systems tend to be justified consensually through stereotypes and other belief systems, they posit a sociobiological explanation which leads to the conclusion that oppression is 'inevitable' (Sidanius & Pratto, 1993). Our social cognitive approach to the study of false consciousness (cf. Bandura, 1986), on the other hand, may suggest ways of ultimately changing the social and political conditions that give rise to it (see Cunningham, 1987; MacKinnon, 1989).

System-justification refers to the psychological process whereby an individual perceives, understands, and explains an existing situation or arrangement with the result that the situation or arrangement is maintained. Unlike ego-justification or group-justification views which postulate a psychologically adaptive mechanism (protection of the ego or the extended collective ego), system-justification does not offer an equivalent function that operates in the service of protecting the interests of the self or the group. In fact, system-justification refers to the psychological process by which existing social arrangements are preserved in spite of the obvious psychological and material harm they entail for disadvantaged individuals and groups. It is this emphasis on the production of false consciousness that contrasts the system-justification view most sharply with previous views. We submit that an explanation of this scope may be required to explain, among other things, negative in-group stereotyping among disadvantaged groups and the societal or cross-societal consensuality of some stereotypes.

Evidence for stereotyping as system-justification

Our purpose in this section is to review a series of social psychological findings demonstrating that people will develop ideas about the characteristics of the self and others on the basis of some social arrangement, like a division of social roles or responsibilities, or an outcome such as a legal decision or victimization by assault. In such domains, it has been found that people will ascribe to themselves and others traits which are consonant with their social position, whether positive or negative, rather than question the order or legitimacy of the system which produced such an arrangement or outcome. These tendencies toward system-justification occur even when subjects know that the arrangements or outcomes were arrived at arbitrarily and result in negative consequences for them. Stereotyping in such circumstances may result in false consciousness, the holding of 'false beliefs that sustain one's own oppression' (Cunningham, 1987, p. 255).

For example, random assignment in an experiment leads one individual to play the role of 'contestant' and another to play the role of 'questioner'; historical events lead Africans to serve as slaves and Europeans to serve as masters; and evolutionary events lead to the ability of females, but not males, to bear offspring. Then, an experimental division of roles leads contestant, and observer to identify the questioner as more knowledgeable (Ross *et al.*, 1977); assignment to the role of slave leads both master and slave to view the slave as 'child-like' and 'subservient' (e.g. Ashmore & Del Boca, 1981); and assignment to the role of child-bearer leads women and men to see women as 'nurturing' and men as 'autonomous' (e.g. Eagly & Steffen, 1984; Hoffman & Hurst, 1990). Once a set of events produces certain social arrangements, whether by historical accident or human intention, the resulting arrangements tend to be explained and justified simply because they exist. Stereotyping, as it operates in such contexts, appears to be a psychological vehicle for system-justification.

The concept of 'system' here is an admittedly vague term, intended to cover a wide variety of cases. We mean to include social arrangements such as those found in families, institutions, organizations, social groups, governments, and nature. System-justification refers to the psychological process whereby prevailing conditions, be they social, political, economic, sexual, or legal, are accepted, explained, and justified simply because they exist. As Mason (1971) writes, the disadvantaged come to 'believe that the system is part of the order of nature and that things will always be like this' (p. 11). We argue that stereotypes often are used to serve this ideological function. The research literature we review is that of experimental social psychology, although work in many other disciplines is relevant to our thesis. It is no accident that most of the experiments supporting our position involve an inequality in the division of roles or outcomes, since inequality between individuals or groups needs to be justified in order for it to be maintained.

Our view is well-suited to account for the myriad of results indicating that stereotypes based on social class are pervasive and system-justifying (e.g. Ashmore & McConahay, 1975; Darley & Gross, 1983; Dittmarr, 1992; Feldman, 1972; Howard & Pike, 1986; Jones, 1991). We emphasize the tendency for people to infer stereotypic attributes

directly from information about status or position, mainly in order to justify *differences* in status or position. Thus, stereotypes of the working class as unintelligent, incompetent, dirty, and unreliable may serve the ideological function of rationalizing their economic plight. Similarities between stereotypes of the lower class and those of African Americans have led some to suggest that racial stereotypes were inferred from economic disadvantage (e.g. Bayton *et al.*, 1956; Jussim *et al.*, 1987; Smedley & Bayton, 1978; Triandis, 1977), a point which is congenial to our perspective.

The work of Eagly and her colleagues (Eagly, 1987; Eagly & Steffen, 1984, 1986; Eagly & Wood, 1982) is important because it demonstrates that stereotypes emerge in order to explain or justify existing divisions of labour. For example, Eagly & Steffen (1984) found that gender stereotypes are derived from assumptions about men and women occupying different roles. In particular, it was demonstrated that people judge women to be 'communal' because it is consistent with their assumed 'homemaker' role, and they judge men to be 'agentic' because it is consistent with their assumed role of 'employee'. Thus, male homemakers were rated to be as communal as female homemakers and more communal than females whose occupation was unspecified, while female employees were seen as more agentic than male employees and males with no occupational description given. Eagly & Steffen (1986) extended these results by demonstrating that part-time female employees were stereotyped as more communal and less agentic than full-time female employees, and part-time male employees were judged to be less agentic than full-time male employees. The authors argued that 'the proximal cause of gender stereotypes is the differing distributions of women and men into social roles' (Eagly & Steffen, 1984, p. 752), since people's stereotypes were mediated by their beliefs about the targets' occupations. Stereotyping may therefore arise from efforts to explain and justify why men and women typically occupy different social roles.

Hoffman & Hurst (1990) similarly stress the importance of social roles in determining the contents of stereotypes. Following Eagly, they argue that gender stereotypes 'originate in an attempt to rationalize the division of labor by attributing to each sex those qualities deemed necessary for performance of the assigned functions' (pp. 206–7). By asking subjects to complete trait ratings of two fictional groups, 'Orinthians' and 'Ackmians', whose occupations were listed as 'child raisers' and 'city workers', respectively, Hoffman & Hurst demonstrate that people spontaneously stereotype the groups in ways that justify their alleged division into separate roles in society. Specifically, child raisers were judged to be more patient, kind, and understanding than city workers, who were judged to be self-confident and forceful. Furthermore, stereotyping in general was more prevalent when subjects were first asked to explain why the groups occupied different roles, lending support to the notion that stereotypes are created by a demand to justify an existing arrangement. A second experiment replicated the basic finding for two other social roles, 'business persons' and 'academics', who were stereotyped as 'extraverted/ambitious' and 'introverted/intellectual' respectively.

Because subjects in the Hoffman & Hurst studies were judging fictional groups on another planet, they had no personal or group conduct in need of justification. Nevertheless, they attributed traits to each of the groups in such a way that the existing state of affairs was reinforced. Hoffman & Hurst (1990) write that gender 'stereotypes are largely an attempt to rationalize, justify, or explain the sexual division of labour' (p. 199), a conclusion which forms the basis of our system-justification approach.

Skrypnek & Snyder (1982) establish a further link between stereotyping and system-justification by showing that subjects' gender stereotypes bring about divisions of labour which are consistent with the stereotypes. Specifically, stereotypic expectations led females who were believed by others to be male to choose to perform stereotypically 'masculine tasks' such as fixing a light switch or attaching bait to a fishing hook, while females who were believed to be female opted for 'feminine tasks' such as decorating a birthday cake and ironing a shirt (see Geis, 1993, for a more complete discussion of expectancy confirmation with respect to gender stereotypes). Taking the studies by Eagly & Steffen (1984, 1986), Hoffman & Hurst (1990), and Skrypnek & Snyder (1982) together, it seems that gender stereotypes both reflect and reproduce the division of social roles. The system-justification view holds that stereotypes follow from social and political systems in that certain systems lead people to stereotype themselves and others in such a way that their status, role, and the system in general are explained and justified. In this way, stereotypic beliefs both reflect and justify existing social arrangements.

A number of studies have demonstrated that people will ascribe traits to themselves as well as other people in such a way that the status or role that they occupy is justified. For example, in a singularly important demonstration, Ross *et al.* (1977) showed the ease with which a social situation creates justification for beliefs about the self and others. The researchers randomly assigned subjects to play either the role of contestant or questioner in a variant of the game of 'Jeopardy', which tests players' aptitude for general knowledge. Results were that people attributed greater knowledge to questioners than contestants simply because the latter were in a far more challenging position, despite the fact that assignment to these roles was explicitly random, and that any differences which emerged were due purely to the position subjects found themselves occupying. These false attributions persisted even when subjects judged their *own* abilities: people judged themselves to be less knowledgeable when they were assigned to the contestant role than when they were assigned to the questioner role. Ross *et al.* acknowledge the relevance of their findings for what we refer to as false consciousness:

> People are apt to underestimate the extent to which seemingly positive attributes of the powerful simply reflect the advantages of social control. Indeed, this distortion in social judgment could provide a particularly insidious brake upon social mobility, whereby the disadvantaged and powerless overestimate the capabilities of the powerful who, in turn, inappropriately deem members of their own caste well-suited to their particular leadership tasks (p. 494).

The result, of course, is that the powerful are stereotyped, even by the powerless, in such a way that their success is explained or justified; meanwhile, the powerless are stereotyped (and self-stereotyped) in such a way that their plight is well-deserved and similarly justified. The process may be self-perpetuating in that people who are stereotyped tend to choose social roles for themselves that are consistent with the stereotypic expectations others have of them (e.g. Geis, 1993; Skrypnek & Snyder, 1982; Swann 1983). To the extent that stigmatized groups can be made to believe in their own inferiority, they may be prevented from achieving positive outcomes (e.g. Steele, 1992).

Another body of evidence suggesting that people will form negative ideas about themselves in order to make sense of social reality comes from Lerner's (1980) work on the just-world theory. Lerner argues that people are motivated to subscribe to a 'belief in a just

world' in which people 'get what they deserve', since it is only in such a world that people can have control over outcomes (e.g. Lerner, 1980; Lerner & Miller, 1978). The theory accounts for the phenomenon of self-blame among victims of violence (e.g. Janoff-Bulman, 1992; Miller & Porter, 1983; Wortman, 1976), which we take to be analogous to the problem of negative self-stereotyping among the disadvantaged, by postulating that victims would rather blame themselves for their plight than admit that the world in which they live is 'capricious and unfair' (Miller & Porter, 1983, p. 140; but see Crocker & Major, 1989).

Consistent with the notion that people engage in blaming the self or the in-group for negative consequences in order to maintain their belief that people get what they deserve, Howard (1984) reported that females as well as males tend to blame female victims of physical assault more than male victims. The author concludes that these results are difficult to account for in terms of ego-defence (and, we would add, group-defence). In situations such as this, people seem to be more interested in justifying a system that condones terrifying outcomes than in defending the innocence of its victims, even when they are members of the in-group. Cunningham (1987) cites 'false blame' as one of the main types of false consciousness. From perspectives such as marxism and feminism, it is indeed false for members of disadvantaged groups to blame themselves or each other for their misfortune (e.g. Cunningham, 1987; MacKinnon, 1989).

Just-world theory is compatible with the marxist/feminist view of stereotyping as ideology, since both views hold that attributions about groups of people are made in such a way that the apparent integrity and rationality of the social world is sustained, even at the expense of personal or group interest. The difference, perhaps, is that Lerner (1980) sees the 'belief in a just world' as a natural, universal motivation, whereas critical theorists might interpret the need for ideological justification as a requirement particular to exceedingly exploitative systems such as capitalism, totalitarianism, or patriarchy. Our expectation is that system-justification will vary widely according to social, historical, cultural, and economic contexts (cf. Billig, 1985).

Although not directly related to stereotyping, Tyler and colleagues have sought to understand why people maintain loyalty to legal and political institutions even when such institutions produce unfavourable outcomes for them (e.g. Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler, 1990; Tyler & McGraw, 1986). We see this problem as analogous to the one we consider here, namely why people subscribe to stereotypes which justify the existing system of arrangements at the psychological expense of the self and the group. For instance, it has been found that people are satisfied with procedural systems as long as they are provided with an opportunity to participate in the process, although their participation has no effect over relevant outcomes (Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler, 1990). Tyler & McGraw (1986) make explicit the connection here to the concept of false consciousness, concluding that 'the disadvantaged are led to focus upon aspects of their situation that are ineffective in inducing a sense of injustice and, hence, lead to political quiescence' (p.126). Similarly, we propose that disadvantaged groups subscribe to stigmatizing stereotypes of themselves and others and thereby justify the system which produces the oppression. The result, of course, is that the existing arrangements are perpetuated.

Greenwald (1980; see also Janoff-Bulman, 1992) has reviewed considerable evidence for 'cognitive conservatism', a disposition to preserve existing systems of knowledge and beliefs at the cost of accuracy in information processing. Greenwald argues that people

tend to resist changing their attitudes and beliefs by selectively attending to and generating attitude-consistent information and by mis-remembering past experiences in order to cohere with current perceptions (see also Ross, 1989). Decision-making theorists, too, have identified a '*status quo* effect' such that people express strong preferences for the current state of affairs, whatever it is, even if new options would be more desirable (e.g. Samuelson & Zeckhauser, 1987; Tetlock, 1992). We suggest that cognitive conservatism and the tendency to prefer choices of inaction to action may contribute to system-justification, since maintaining the legitimacy of existing social arrangements would eliminate the need for attitude and behavioural change.

While Greenwald (1980) sees only an analogy between the practices of conservative systems of government and the cognitive tendency to avoid change, we suggest a more direct link: political systems that seek to preserve the *status quo* at all costs may produce people whose minds work to preserve the *status quo* at all costs. We assume that biases such as 'cognitive conservatism' (e.g. Greenwald, 1980; Janoff-Bulman, 1992) acquire the particular effects they do because they operate in the context of unequal social systems requiring substantial ideological justification, as suggested by critical aspects of feminist and marxist philosophies.

Recent theoretical and empirical advances on the 'cognitive unconscious' (e.g. Greenwald, 1992; Jacoby, Lindsay & Toth, 1992; Kihlstrom, 1990) may help to explain how and why people subscribe to beliefs which harm them. A number of studies have demonstrated the unconscious nature of stereotyping (Banaji, Hardin & Rothman, 1993; Devine, 1989; Gaertner & McLaughlin, 1983; Gilbert & Hixon, 1991), and discussions have focused on implications for theory and practical issues concerning awareness and intentionality (Banaji & Greenwald, 1994; Crosby, Bromley & Saxe, 1980; Fiske, 1989). The findings from this research are important for our discussion of stereotyping and false consciousness for at least two reasons. First and foremost, they demonstrate that prior exposure to stereotype-related information can influence judgements and actions even when perceivers are unaware of it. For example, Banaji & Greenwald (1994) found that subjects unconsciously misattributed fame to males more often than females. Banaji, Hardin & Rothman (1993) showed that word primes associated with a female stereotype (dependence) or a male stereotype (aggression) were used implicitly but selectively in judgements of targets whose gender fit the social category of the primed stereotype. Devine (1989) found that subliminal presentations of racial stereotypes of black Americans later influenced whites' judgements of an ambiguously described person. Gilbert & Hixon (1991) identified the limiting conditions of cognitive load under which subjects are more or less likely to use an unconsciously activated racial stereotype on tasks of word-fragment completion.

While research of this type has demonstrated the effects of perceivers' unawareness of stereotype use, these studies have not examined the effects of implicit stereotyping on targets. We suggest that stereotyped groups and individuals similarly may be unaware of the operation of some stereotypes. Males and females, for example, have been found to be equally unaware of the influence of gender priming on judgements of fame (Banaji & Greenwald, 1994). If this is the case, then *implicit* stereotyping would not allow stigmatized groups to engage in self-protective (or ego-justifying) strategies as suggested by Crocker & Major (1989). In other words, targets who are unaware that a stereotyped judgement has occurred will not attribute that judgment to perceivers' prejudice toward

their social group. Nevertheless, it is quite possible that the effects of such judgements may register unconsciously in affect, cognition, and behaviour. System-justification, especially if it conflicts with personal or group interest, may be more likely when it occurs outside of conscious awareness.

A second way in which research on implicit stereotyping may contribute to an understanding of false consciousness is by demonstrating dissociations between consciously and unconsciously expressed beliefs. For example, Devine (1989) showed that even people who explicitly reject prejudicial attitudes were influenced by previously seen racial primes in judging the aggressiveness of a target. Banaji & Greenwald (1993) found that the bias of assigning males greater fame than females when no such credit was due held irrespective of subjects' conscious beliefs about gender equality. Taken as a whole, the data on implicit stereotyping present an additional challenge for views of stereotyping derived solely from ego- or group-justification since unconscious stereotyping occurs independent of group membership or individual differences with respect to prejudicial attitudes.

While our aim has been to suggest the importance of system-justification, we recognize that people do not always (consciously or unconsciously) subscribe to beliefs which reinforce the *status quo*. That is, we do not claim that system-justification always takes place, or that false consciousness is unavoidable in the face of inequality. We do think, however, that psychologists in general and stereotyping researchers in particular have underemphasized the degree to which people persist in explaining and justifying social systems which disadvantage them.

In order for the concept of system-justification to be useful, future research would need to identify conditions that produce responses of system-justification as opposed to responses of ego- and group-justification. One potential trigger of the system-justification response might be the absence of a revolutionary 'class consciousness' (e.g. Gramsci, 1971; Gurin, Miller & Gurin, 1980; Kalmuss, Gurin & Townsend, 1981; Lukács, 1971; Mészáros, 1971; Meyerson, 1991). Similarly, isolation of disadvantaged group members from one another or low degrees of group identification among them in general may result in increased system-justification (e.g. Archibald, 1989; Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Vaughan, 1978). The relationship between group identification and group consciousness needs to be clarified, as does the question of whether achieving group consciousness (as opposed to what we have been calling false consciousness) requires that one advance negative stereotypes about out-groups in general. A third issue bearing on the operation of system-justification involves a somewhat different use of the concept of 'consciousness' (e.g. Banaji & Greenwald, 1994; Devine, 1989; Greenwald, 1992; Kihlstrom, 1990). System-justification may occur more frequently when judgements are made implicitly or out of conscious awareness. By focusing attention explicitly on issues pertaining to the system of social arrangements, it may be possible to avoid the consequences of system-justification, as researchers have found with respect to stereotyping in general (Greenwald & Banaji, 1993). A fifth and final factor which may make system-justification more likely is the insidiousness of the system. Somewhat paradoxically, it may be that the more painful, humiliating, or unfair a system is, the more it evokes the system-justification response, as cognitive dissonance researchers found when investigating the effects of initiation rites (e.g. Aronson & Mills, 1959; Gerard & Mathewson, 1966).

Implications of the system-justification approach for the content of stereotypes

There is obviously not space here, in the first presentation of our view, to develop fully the many implications and predictions of the system-justification approach for the process of stereotyping and the content of stereotypes. As important as it would be to identify the specific sociological and psychological mechanisms involved in system-justification, we have only pointed out that the phenomenon occurs. The scope of this paper prohibits a more detailed analysis of the ways in which system-justifying stereotypes are developed and spread. Nevertheless, because the foregoing has emphasized processes of justification associated with stereotyping, it seems useful to list some of the main consequences of bringing our perspective to bear on issues of the content of stereotypes. Such consequences include the possibilities that contents of stereotypes are derived from prevailing systems of social arrangements, that changes to the existing system of arrangements will produce changes in the contents of stereotypes, that stereotypes of subordinate groups may be similar across different systems, and that their contents need not originate from a 'kernel of truth'. In addition, we propose that system-justifying stereotypes of disadvantaged groups need not be unfavourable and those of advantaged groups need not be favourable in content. All of these implications, of course, are offered speculatively as hypotheses and would need to be supported by empirical research before being accepted.

The system-justification view assumes that specific contents of stereotypes may be predicted on the basis of objective, material factors such as status or position in society. Tajfel (1978, 1981*a*) was fond of quoting Robert LeVine, who made the following challenge: 'Describe to me the economic intergroup situation, and I shall predict the content of the stereotypes'. Our own position is not one of economic reductionism because it is necessary to understand inequalities due to gender, race, ethnicity, religion, sexual orientation, and other non-economic grounds. At the same time, however, we do conceive of stereotypes as arising from objective, material factors including divisions of labour and social practice rather than, for example, as ideas prior to or independent of material forces in society (see MacKinnon, 1989; Marx & Engels, 1846).

Once in place, stereotypes may reproduce the same old state of affairs by eliciting behavioural confirmation on the part of stereotyped actors (e.g. Geis, 1993; Snyder, 1981). In other words, stigmatized groups may begin to act in such a way that other people's negative expectancies of them are supported, thereby ensuring their continued subordination. For example, Word, Zanna & Cooper (1974) found that white interviewers' stereotypic expectations about black job applicants evoked nervous behaviour and poor performance on the part of black respondents, an outcome which is likely to reinforce rather than supplant racial inequalities. Similarly, Skrypnek & Snyder (1982) demonstrated that subjects' beliefs about the sex of their interaction partner determined the latter's behaviour; partners whom the other believed to be male chose to perform stereotypically male roles, while partners believed to be female chose stereotypically female roles. Thus, stereotyped groups and individuals implicitly may come to deliver what is expected of them, and this may be one way in which stereotypes derived on the basis of social status, position, or role may allow powerless groups to engage in a form of passive resistance (Sunar, 1978) or otherwise perpetuate the target's occupation of that status, position, or role (see Geis, 1993).

A second implication of the system-justification approach which follows from the first is that a most expedient way of changing stereotypes is to change material reality (see Banaji & Greenwald, 1994; Eagly & Steffen, 1984; Hoffman & Hurst, 1990; MacKinnon, 1989), an assumption which is even more basic to our view than to social identity theory. We take evidence presented by social identity theorists (e.g. Haslam, Turner, Oakes, McGarty & Hayes, 1992) that stereotypes change in accordance with alterations in the social structure of relations between groups to be supportive of the position defended here, which is that stereotypes rationalize systems of social, economic, and sexual relations. In many ways, our thesis is similar to one advanced by Campbell & LeVine (1968, p. 561) whose merging of cognitive dissonance theory and anthropological data resulted in the proposition that changes in the system of relations between groups are met by corresponding changes in 'group labels and stereotypes'.

A third prediction of our view is that the stereotype contents of different but also disadvantaged groups may be more similar than would be predicted on the basis of ego-justification or group-justification. Therefore, a somewhat surprising consequence of the system-justification approach is that different groups across cultures should share essentially the same stereotype contents if they share the same relative status in their respective societies. In fact, Tajfel (1970) made just this observation:

> I remember presenting some years ago to students in Oxford a set of adjectives mentioned to me at the time by Jezernik as typical of the Slovene characterizations of immigrant Bosnians. When the students were asked where these descriptions came from and to whom they applied, the unanimous guess was that they were the stereotypes used about coloured immigrants in England (p. 130).

Our system-justification view would predict some commonalities among the stereotypes of different groups who occupy similar statuses in societies, since the ideological justifications needed for these specific situations would be much the same (cf. Sunar, 1978). In order to make a similar point, Millet (1970) considers the similarities between stereotypes of blacks and women and concludes that:

> common opinion associates the same traits with both: inferior intelligence, an instinctual or sensual gratification, an emotional nature both primitive and childlike, an imagined prowess in or affinity for sexuality, a contentment with their own lot which is in accord with a proof of its appropriateness, a wily habit of deceit, and concealment of feeling (p. 57).

We have thus arrived at a peculiar possibility: research on the contents of stereotypes may turn out to be characterized not so much by 'tremendous variations in the specific forms which prejudice assumes', as Katz & Braly (1935, p. 183) reasonably expected, as by regularities in the contents of stereotypes of different groups which may emerge by virtue of their similar positions in society. An informal review by Sunar (1978) supports such a prediction, as does the historical work of Myrdal (1944), although more systematic research is obviously needed. The system-justification approach at any rate offers the possibility that the contents of stereotypes may be predicted as well as described (e.g. Hoffman & Hurst, 1990).

A fourth implication of our view is that stereotypes need not arise from a 'kernel of truth', as psychologists and laypersons have frequently assumed (e.g. see Allport, 1954; Brigham, 1971; Fishman, 1956). If the kernel of truth view holds that *each* stereotype

must *originate* on the basis of some valid observation of differences between groups, then we disagree with it. Insofar as stereotypes arise in order to justify some system of social arrangements, they may arise out of false as well as 'true' consciousness; the justification used may bear no relation to actual characteristics of the group. This was the case in the experiments conducted by Hoffman & Hurst (1990), who showed that stereotypes about child raisers and city workers develop not from observed differences in attributes or behaviours, but from a rationalization of the division of social roles.

However, it has become customary to take demonstrations of the self-fulfilling nature of stereotypic expectancies as supporting the 'kernel of truth' position. In other words, stereotypes that were false to begin with may *acquire* a kind of accuracy because stereotyped individuals and groups conform to others' expectations of them (e.g. Geis, 1993). If this is what is meant by the kernel of truth view, then it is compatible with the system-justification view. We agree that some group differences may become validated through processes of behavioural confirmation or material deprivation, but this validity is indeed a specious one.

It is important to note that the system-justification view does not assume that disadvantaged groups will be stereotyped in negative terms, only that they will be stereotyped in ways that justify their occupation of a particular status or role. For instance, Saunders (1972) finds that blacks in Brazil are stereotyped as 'faithful' and 'humble', since these attributes justify their use as servants for whites. In contrast to earlier studies by McKee & Sherriffs (1956) and Broverman *et al.* (1972), Eagly and her colleagues have suggested that stereotypes of women are actually more favourable than stereotypes of men (Eagly & Mladinic, 1989; Eagly, Mladinic & Otto, 1991). It would be useful to determine whether positive stereotypes of women actually serve to perpetuate their disadvantaged position in society (e.g. Hoffman & Hurst, 1990). While evidence for the favourability of female stereotypes is undoubtedly important (see Eagly & Mladinic, 1994, for a review), it is difficult to rule out demand characteristics associated with subjects' unwillingness to express unpopular negative attitudes about stigmatized groups. Furthermore, people may hold racist or sexist beliefs that are 'aversive' to them and therefore are expressed only indirectly (e.g. Dovidio & Gaertner, 1986), and people's explicitly avowed stereotypical beliefs may bear no relation to their implicit beliefs about out-group members (e.g. Devine, 1989).

Just as the system-justification perspective does not assume that underprivileged groups will be stereotyped negatively, neither does it assume that privileged groups will always be stereotyped in positive terms. It has been suggested that dominant groups will occasionally evaluate subordinate groups more favourably than their own group in an effort to lend legitimacy to the *status quo* (e.g. van Knippenberg, 1978), although the evidence for out-group favouritism among high-status groups does not seem to be very strong in the experimental literature on intergroup relations (see Jost, 1993). Nevertheless, both men and women seem to hold stereotypes of men that include socially undesirable traits such as 'aggressive', 'selfish', 'competitive, and 'hostile' (e.g. Eagly & Mladinic, 1994; Spence, Helmreich & Holahan, 1979; Widiger & Settle, 1987). According to the system-justification view, even negative stereotypes of dominant groups may serve the function of system-justification, as long as they indicate that the group is somehow well-suited for its status or role. Thus, men's relative success in a competitive social or economic system may be justified by attributing to them a high endowment of competitive qualities.

Conclusion

We have argued that system-justification may override motives to justify the positions or actions of the self or group, thus leading to negative stereotyping of the self or in-group and the high degree of consensuality of stereotypes. The review of selected evidence indicates that people often will make sense of existing states of affairs by assigning attributes to the self and others that are consonant with the roles or positions occupied by individuals and groups. Stereotypes appear to serve a system-justification function for their adherents such that prevailing systems of social arrangements are justified and reproduced. By acknowledging the importance of stereotyping as justification, the psychological basis of false consciousness can begin to be addressed.

Acknowledgements

We thank Robert Abelson, Richard D. Ashmore, R. Bhaskar, Galen Bodenhausen, Theresa Claire, Leonard W. Doob, Alice Eagly, Florence L. Geis, and Felicia Pratto for their extremely generous comments on a previous version of the paper. Preparation of the manuscript was supported in part by the National Science Foundation Grant DBC 9120987.

References

Aboud, F. E. (1988). *Children and Prejudice*. New York: Basil Blackwell.

Adorno, T. W., Frenkel-Brunswik, E., Levinson, D. J. & Sanford, R. N. (1950). *The Authoritarian Personality*. New York: Harper.

Allport, G. W. (1954/1958). *The Nature of Prejudice*. Cambridge, MA: Addison-Wesley.

Apfelbaum, E. (1979). Relations of domination and movements for liberation: An analysis of power between groups. In W. G. Austin & S. Worchel (Eds), *The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations*. Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole.

Archibald, W. P. (1989). *Marx and the Missing Link: 'Human Nature'*. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press International.

Aronson, E. & Mills, J. (1959). The effects of severity of initiation on liking for a group. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 59, 177–181.

Ashmore, R. D. & Del Boca, F. K. (1981). Conceptual approaches to stereotypes and stereotyping. In D. L. Hamilton (Ed.), *Cognitive Processes in Stereotyping and Intergroup Behaviour*. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

Ashmore, R. D. & Del Boca, F. K. (1986). *The Social Psychology of Female–Male Relations: A Critical Analysis of Central Concepts*. New York: Academic Press.

Ashmore, R. D. & McConahay, J. B. (1975). *Psychology and America's Urban Dilemmas*. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Banaji, M. R. & Greenwald, A. G. (1993). Implicit gender stereotyping in judgements of fame. Unpublished manuscript, Yale University.

Banaji, M. R. & Greenwald, A. G. (1994). Implicit stereotyping and prejudice. In M. P. Zanna & J. M. Olson (Eds), *The Psychology of Prejudice/The Ontario Symposium*, vol. 7. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

Banaji, M. R., Hardin, C. D. & Rothman, A. J. (1993). Implicit stereotyping in person judgement. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 65, 272–281.

Bandura, A. (1983). Psychological mechanisms of aggression. In R. G. Geen & E. I. Donnersten (Eds), *Aggression: Theoretical and Empirical Reviews*, vol. 1. New York: Academic Press.

Bandura, A. (1986). *Social Foundations of Thought and Action: A Social Cognitive Theory*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Banks, W. C. (1976). White preference in blacks: A paradigm in search of a phenomenon. *Psychological Bulletin*, 83, 1179–1186.

Bar-Tal, D. (1989). Delegitimization: The extreme case of stereotyping and prejudice. In D. Bar-Tal, C. F. Graumann, A. W. Kruglanski & W. Stroebe (Eds), *Stereotyping and Prejudice: Changing Conceptions*. New York: Springer-Verlag.

Bar-Tal, D. (1990). *Group Beliefs: A Conception for Analyzing Group Structure, Processes, and Behavior*. New York: Springer-Verlag.

Bar-Tal, D., Graumann, C., Kruglanski, A. W. & Stroebe, W. (1989). *Changing Conceptions of Stereotyping and Prejudice*. New York: Springer-Verlag.

Basow, S. A. (1986). *Gender Stereotypes: Traditions and Alternatives*. Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole.

Bayton, J. A., McAlister, L. B. & Hamer, J. (1956). Race-class stereotypes. *Journal of Negro Education*, 41, 75–78.

Bem, D. J. (1972). Self perception theory. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology*, vol. 6. New York: Academic Press.

Bem, S. L. & Bem, D. J. (1970). Case study of a nonconscious ideology: Training the woman to know her place. In D. J. Bem (Ed.), *Beliefs, Attitudes, and Human Affairs*. Belmont, CA: Brooks/Cole.

Bernat, G. & Balch, P. (1979). The Chicano Racial Attitude Measure (CRAM): Results of an initial investigation. *American Journal of Community Psychology*, 7, 137–146.

Bettelheim, B. & Janowitz, M. (1964). *Social Change and Prejudice*. New York: Free Press.

Billig, M. (1976). *Social Psychology and Intergroup Relations*. London: Academic Press.

Billig, M. (1985). Prejudice, categorization and particularization: From a perceptual to a rhetorical approach. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 15, 79–103.

Blumenthal, M. D., Kahn, R. L., Andrews, F. M. & Head, K. B. (1972). *Justifying Violence: Attitudes of American Men*. Ann Arbor, MI: Institute for Social Research.

Brewer, M. B. & Kramer, R. M. (1985). The psychology of intergroup attitudes and behaviour. *Annual Review of Psychology*, 36, 219–243.

Brickman, P. (1987). *Commitment, Conflict, and Caring*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Brigham, J. C. (1971). Ethnic stereotypes. *Psychological Bulletin*, 76, 15–33.

Brock, T. C. & Buss, A. H. (1964). Effects of justification for aggression and communication with the victim on postaggression dissonance. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 68, 403–412.

Broverman, I., Vogel, S. R., Broverman, D. M., Clarkson, F. E. & Rosenkrantz, P. S. (1972). Sex-role stereotypes: A current appraisal. *Journal of Social Issues*, 28, 59–78.

Brown, R. (1986). *Social Psychology* (2nd ed). New York: Free Press.

Campbell, D. T. & LeVine, R. A. (1968). Ethnocentrism and intergroup relations. In R. P. Abelson, E. Aronson, W. J. McGuire, T. M. Newcomb, M. J. Rosenberg & P. H. Tannenbaum (Eds), *Theories of Cognitive Consistency: A Sourcebook*. Chicago: Rand McNally.

Chaikin, A. L. & Darley, J. M. (1973). Victim or perpetrator? Defensive attribution of responsibility and the need for order and justice. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 25, 268–275.

Cialdini, R. B., Henrick, D. T. & Hoerig, J. (1976). Victim derogation in the Lerner paradigm: Just world or just justification. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 33, 719–724.

Clark, K. B. & Clark, M. P. (1947). Racial identification and preferences in Negro children. In T. M. Newcomb & E. L. Hartley (Eds), *Readings in Social Psychology*. New York: Holt.

Condor, S. (1990). Social stereotypes and social identity. In D. Abrams & M. A. Hogg (Eds), *Social Identity Theory: Constructive and Critical Advances*. Hemel Hempstead: Harvester.

Corenblum, B. & Annis, R. C. (in press). Development of racial identity in minority and majority children: An affect discrepancy model. *Canadian Journal of Behavioural Science*.

Cox, O. C. (1948/1959). *Caste, Class and Race: A Study in Social Dynamics*. New York: Monthly Review Press.

Crocker, J. & Major, B. (1989). Social stigma and self-esteem: The self-protective properties of stigma. *Psychological Review*, 96, 608–630.

Crosby, F., Bromley, S. & Saxe, L. (1980). Recent unobtrusive studies of black and white discrimination and prejudice: A literature review. *Psychological Bulletin*, 87, 546–563.

Cunningham, F. (1987). *Democratic Theory and Socialism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Darley, J. M. & Gross, R. H. (1983). A hypothesis-confirming bias in labeling effects. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 44, 20–33.

Devine, P. G. (1989). Stereotypes and prejudice: Their automatic and controlled components. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 56, 5–18.

Diab, L. (1962). National stereotypes and the 'reference group' concept. *Journal of Social Psychology*, 57, 339–351.

Dittmart, H. (1992). Perceived material wealth and first impressions. *British Journal of Social Psychology*, 31, 379–391.

Dovidio, J. F. & Gaertner, S. L. (1986). *Prejudice, Discrimination, and Racism.* Orlando, FL: Academic Press.
Eagleton, T. (1991). *Ideology.* London: Verso.
Eagly, A. H. (1987). *Sex Differences in Social Behaviour: A Social-Role Interpretation.* Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Eagly, A. H. & Mladinic, A. (1989). Gender stereotypes and attitudes toward women and men. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 15, 543–558.
Eagly, A. H. & Mladinic, A. (1994). Are people prejudiced against women? Some answers from research on attitudes, gender stereotypes and judgements of competence. In W. Stroebe & M. Hewstone (Eds), *European Review of Social Pyschology*, vol. 5. New York: Wiley.
Eagly, A. H., Mladinic, A. & Otto, S. (1991). Are women evaluated more favourably than men? *Psychology of Women Quarterly*, 15, 203–216.
Eagly, A. H. & Steffen, V. J. (1984). Gender stereoypes stem from the distribution of women and men into social roles. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, vol. 5, 46, 735–754.
Eagly, A. H. & Steffen, V. J. (1986). Gender stereotypes, occupational roles, and beliefs about part-time employees. *Psychology of Women Quarterly*, 10, 252–262.
Eagly, A. H. & Wood, W. (1982). Inferred sex differences in status as a determinant of gender stereotypes about social influence. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 43, 915–928.
Ehrlich, H. J. (1973). *The Social Psychology of Prejudice.* New York: Wiley.
Elster, J. (1982). Belief, bias, and ideology. In M. Hollis & S. Lukes (Eds), *Rationality and Relativism.* Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Feldman, J. M. (1972). Stimulus characteristics and subject prejudice as determinants of stereotype attribution. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 21, 333–340.
Festinger, L. (1954). A theory of social comparison processes. *Human Relations*, 7, 117–140.
Festinger, L. (1957). *A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance.* Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Festinger, L. & Carlsmith, J. M. (1959). Cognitive consequences of forced compliance. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 58, 203–210.
Fine, M. & Bowers, C. (1984). Racial self-identification: The effects of social history and gender. *Journal of Applied Social Psychology*, 58, 203–210.
Fishman, J. A. (1956). An examination of the process and function of social stereotyping. *Journal of Social Psychology*, 43, 27–64.
Fiske, S. T. (1989). Examining the role of intent: Toward understanding its role in stereotyping and prejudice. In J. S. Uleman & J. A. Bargh (Eds), *Unintended Thought.* New York: Guilford Press.
Freud, S. (1946). *The Ego and Mechanisms of Defense.* New York: International University Press.
Gaertner, S. L. & McLaughlin, J. P. (1983). Racial stereotypes: Associations and ascriptions of positive and negative characteristics. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 46, 23–30.
Geis, F. L. (1993). Self-fulfilling prophecies: A social psychological view of gender. In A. E. Beall & R. J. Sternberg (Eds), *Perspectives on the Psychology of Gender.* New York: Guilford
Gerard, H. B. (1957). Some effects of status, role clarity and group goal clarity upon individuals' relation to group process. *Journal of Personality*, 25, 475–488.
Gerard, H. B. & Mathewson, G. C. (1966). The effects of severity of initiation on liking for a group: A replication. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 2, 278–287.
Gergen, K. J. (1969). The significance of skin color in human relations. *Daedalus*, 390–406.
Gilbert, D. T. & Hixon, J. G. (1991). The trouble of thinking: Activation and application of stereotypic beliefs. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 60, 509–517.
Giles, H., & Powesland, P. F. (1975). *Speech Style and Social Evaluation.* London: Academic Press.
Gramsci, A. (1971). *Selections From the Prison Notebooks.* New York: International Publishers.
Greenwald, A. G. (1980). The totalitarian ego: Fabrication and revision of personal history. *American Psychologist*, 35, 603–618.
Greenwald, A. G. (1992). New look 3: Unconscious cognition reclaimed. *American Psychologist*, 47, 766–779.
Greenwald, A. G. & Banaji, M. R. (1993). A theory of implicit social cognition: Attitudes, stereotypes, self, and prejudice. Unpublished manuscript, University of Washington.
Greenwald, H. J. & Oppenheim, D. B. (1968). Reported magnitude of self-identification among Negro children: Artifact? *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 8, 49–52.
Gregor, A. J. & McPherson, D. A. (1966). Racial preference and ego-identity among white and Bantu children in the republic of South Africa. *Genetic Psychology Monographs*, 73, 217–253.

Gurin, P., Miller, A. H. & Gurin, G. (1980). Stratum identification and consciousness. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 43, 30–47.
Hamilton, D. L. (1981). *Cognitive Processes in Stereotyping and Intergroup Behavior.* Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Hamilton, D. L. & Trolier, T. K. (1986). Stereotypes and stereotyping: An overview of the cognitive approach. In J. F. Dovidio & S. L. Gaertner (Eds), *Prejudice, Discrimination, and Racism.* Orlando, FL: Academic Press.
Haslam, S. A., Turner, J. C., Oakes, P. J., McGarty, C. & Hayes, B. K. (1992). Context-dependent variation in social stereotyping 1: The effects of intergroup relations as mediated by social change and frame of reference. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 22, 3–20.
Hastie, R. (1984). Causes and effects of causal attribution. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 46, 44–56.
Heider, F. (1958). *The Psychology of Interpersonal Relations.* New York: Wiley.
Herek, G. (1984). Beyond 'homophobias': A social psychological perspective on attitudes toward lesbians and gay men. *Journal of Homosexuality*, 10, 1–21.
Herek, G. (1986). The instrumentality of attitudes: Toward a neofunctional theory. *Journal of Social Issues*, 42, 99–114.
Hewstone, M. (1989). *Causal Attribution.* Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Hewstone, M & Giles, H. (1986). Social groups and social stereotypes in intergroup communication: A review and model of intergroup communication breakdown. In W. B. Gudykunst (Ed.), *Intergroup Communication.* London: Arnold.
Hewstone, M. & Jaspars, J. (1984). Social dimensions of attribution. In H. Tajfel (Ed.), *The Social Dimension: European Developments in Social Psychology*, vol. 2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hewstone, M., Jaspars, J. & Lalljee, M. (1982). Social representations, social attribution and social identity: The intergroup images of 'public' and 'comprehensive' schoolboys. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 12, 241–269.
Hinkle, S. & Brown, R. (1990). Intergroup comparisons and social identity: Some links and lacunae. In D. Abrams & M. A. Hogg (Eds), *Social Identity Theory: Constructive and Critical Advances.* Hemel Hempstead: Harvester.
Hoffman, C. & Hurst, N. (1990). Gender stereotypes: Perception or rationalization? *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 58, 197–208.
Hogg, M. A. & Abrams, D. (1988). *Social Identifications: A Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations and Group Processes.* London: Routledge.
Hogg, M. A., & Turner, J. C. (1987). Intergroup behaviour, self-stereotyping and the salience of social categories. *British Journal of Social Psychology*, 26, 325–340.
Howard, J. A. (1984). Societal influences on attribution: Blaming some victims more than others. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 47, 494–505.
Howard, J. A. & Pike, K. C. (1986). Ideological investment in cognitive processing: The influence of social statuses on attribution. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 49, 154–167.
Howard, J. & Rothbart, M. (1980). Social categorization and memory for in-group and out-group behavior. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 38, 301–310.
Hraba, J. & Grant, G. (1970). Black is beautiful: A reexamination of racial preference and identification. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 16, 398–402.
Huici, C. (1984). The individual and social functions of sex role stereotypes. In H. Tajfel (Ed.), *The Social Dimension*, vol. 2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Jacoby, L. L., Lindsay, D. S. & Toth, J. P. (1992). Unconscious processes revealed: A question of control. *American Psychologist*, 47, 802–809.
Jahoda, G., Thompson, S. S. & Bhatt, S. (1972). Ethnic identity and preferences among Asian immigrant children in Glasgow. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 2, 19–32.
Janoff-Bulman, R. (1992). *Shattered Assumptions: Toward a New Psychology of Trauma.* New York: Free Press.
Jones, E. E. (1964). *Ingratiation.* New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts.
Jones, E. E., Kanouse, D. E., Kelley, H. H., Nisbett, R. E., Valins, S. & Weiner, B. (1972). *Attribution: Perceiving the Causes of Behaviour.* Morristown, NJ: General Learning Press.
Jones, M. (1991). Stereotyping Hispanics and Whites: Perceived differences in social roles as a determinant of ethnic stereotypes. *Journal of Social Psychology*, 131, 469–476.

Jost, J. T. (1993). Is it time for a theory of *out*group favoritism? A comment on the paper by Mullen, Brown & Smith. Unpublished manuscript, Yale University.
Jussim, L., Coleman, L. M. & Lerch, L. (1987). The nature of stereotypes: A comparison and integration of three theories. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 52, 536–546.
Kahn, R. L. (1972). The justification of violence: Social problems and social solutions. *Journal of Social Issues*, 28, 155–175.
Kalmuss, D., Gurin, P. & Townsend, A. L. (1981). Feminist and sympathetic feminist consciousness. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 11, 131–147.
Katz, D. (1960). The functional approach to the study of attitudes. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 24, 163–204.
Katz, D. & Braly, K. (1933). Racial stereotypes in one hundred college students. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 28, 280–290.
Katz, D. & Braly, K. (1935). Racial prejudice and racial stereotypes. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 30, 175–193.
Katz, P. A., & Zalk, S. R. (1974). Doll preferences: An index of racial attitudes? *Journal of Educational Psychology*, 66, 663–668.
Kelley, H. H. (1967). Attribution theory in social psychology. In D. Levine (Ed.), *Nebraska Symposium on Motivation*, vol. 15. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
Kihlstrom, J. F. (1990). The psychological unconscious. In L. A. Pervin (Ed.), *Handbook of Personality: Theory and Research*. New York: Guilford Press.
Kipnis, D. (1976). *The Powerholders*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Kluegel, J. R. & Smith, E. R. (1986). *Beliefs About Inequality: Americans' Views of What is and What Ought to Be*. New York: Aldine de Gruyter.
Lambert, W. E., Hodgson, R. C., Gardner, R. C. & Fillenbaum, S. (1960). Evaluational reactions to spoken languages. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 60, 44–51.
LaPiere, R. T. (1936). Type-rationalizations of group antipathy. *Social Forces*, 15, 232–237.
LaVioletre, F. & Silvert, K. H. (1951). A theory of stereotypes. *Social Forces*, 29, 257–262.
Lerner, M. J. (1980). *The Belief in a Just World: A Fundamental Delusion*. New York: Plenum Press.
Lerner, M. J. & Miller, D. T. (1978). Just world research and the attribution process: Looking back and ahead. *Psychological Bulletin*, 85, 1030–1051.
Lewin, K. (1941). Self-hatred among Jews. *Contemporary Jewish Record*, June, 461–474.
Lifton, R. J. (1986). *The Nazi Doctors: Medical Killing and the Psychology of Genocide*. New York: Basic Books.
Lind, E. A. & Tyler, T. R. (1988). *The Social Psychology of Procedural Justice*. New York: Plenum Press.
Lippmann, W. (1922). *Public Opinion*. New York: Macmillan.
Lorenzi-Cioldi, F. (1991). Self-stereotyping and self-enhancement in gender groups. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 21, 403–417.
Lukács, G. (1971). *History and Class Consciousness*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Maass, A. & Schaller, M. (1991). Intergroup biases and the cognitive dynamics of stereotype formation. In W. Stroebe & M. Hewstone (Eds), *European Review of Social Psychology*, vol. 2. New York: Wiley.
MacKinnon, C. A. (1989). *Toward a Feminist Theory of the State*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Marcuse, H. (1964). *One-dimensional Man*. Boston: Beacon Press.
Marshall, G. D. & Zimbardo, P. G. (1979). Affective consequences of inadequately explained physiological arousal. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 37, 970–988.
Martin, J., Scully, M. & Levitt, B. (1990). Injustice and the legitimation of revolution: Damning the past, excusing the present, and neglecting the future. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 59, 281–290.
Marx, K. & Engels, F. (1846/1970). *The German Ideology* (Ed. C. J. Arthur). New York: International Publishers.
Mason, P. (1971). *Patterns of Dominance*. London: Oxford University Press.
McClure, J. (1991). *Explanations, Accounts and Illusions: A Critical Analysis*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
McKee, J. P. & Sherriffs, A. C. (1956). The differential evaluation of males and females. *Journal of Personality*, 25, 356–371.
McLaughlin, M. L., Cody, M. J. & Read, S. (1992). *Explaining One's Self to Others: Reason-giving in a Social Context*. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
McMurtry, J. (1978). *The Structure of Marx's World-view*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

McNaught, B. R. (1983). Overcoming self-hate in gays. In G. W. Albee, J. M. Joffe & L. A. Dusenbury (Eds), *Prevention, Powerlessness, and Politics: Readings on Social Change*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
Messick, D. M. & Mackie, D. (1989) Intergroup relations. *Annual Review of Psychology*, 40, 45–81.
Mészáros, I. (1971). *Aspects of History and Class Consciousness*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Meyerson, D. (1991). *False Consciousness*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Miller, D. T. & Porter, C. A. (1983). Self-blame in victims of violence. *Journal of Social Issues*, 39, 139–152.
Millet, K. (1970). *Sexual Politics*. New York: Avon Books.
Milner, D. (1981). Racial prejudice. In J. C. Turner & H. Giles (Eds), *Intergroup Behaviour*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Monson, T. C. & Snyder, M. (1977). Actors, observers and the attribution process: Toward a reconceptualization. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 13, 89–111.
Mullen, B., Brown, R. J. & Smith, C. (1992). Ingroup bias as a function of salience, relevance, and status: An integration. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 22, 103–122.
Myrdal, G. (1944). *An American Dilemma*. New York: Harper & Row.
Nisbett, R. E. & Ross, L. D. (1980). *Human Inference: Strategies and Shortcomings of Social Judgement*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Oakes, P. J. & Turner, J. C. (1990). Is limited information processing capacity the cause of social stereotyping? In W. Stroebe & M. Hewstone (Eds), *European Review of Social Psychology*, vol. 1. New York: Wiley.
Parkin, F. (1971). *Class Inequality and Political Order*. New York: Praeger.
Pepitone, A. (1950). Motivational effects in social perception. *Human Relations*, 3, 57–76.
Peterson, B., & Ramirez, M. (1971). Real, ideal-self disparity in Negro and Mexican-American children. *Psychology*, 8, 22–26.
Pettigrew, T. (1964). *A Profile of the Negro American*. Princeton: Van Nostrand.
Porter, J. R. & Washington, R. E. (1989). Developments in research on black identity and self-esteem: 1979–1988. *Revue Internationale de Psychologie Sociale*, 2, 341–353.
Prothro, E. T. (1954). Cross-cultural patterns of national stereotypes. *Journal of Social Psychology*, 40, 53–59.
Rosenberg, M. (1989). Old myths die hard: The case of black self-esteem. *Revue Internationale de Psychologie Sociale*, 2, 357–365.
Ross, L. D., Amabile, T. M. & Steinmetz, J. L. (1977). Social role, social control, and biases in social-perception processes. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 35, 485–494.
Ross, M. (1989). Relation of implicit theories to the construction of personal histories. *Psychological Review*, 96, 341–357.
Ryan, W. (1971). *Blaming the Victim*. New York: Pantheon Books.
Sagar, H. A. & Schofield, J. W. (1980). Racial and behavioural cues in black and white children's perceptions of ambiguously aggressive acts. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 39, 590–598.
Sampson, E. E. (1969). Studies of status congruence. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology*, vol. 2. New York: Academic Press.
Samuelson, W. & Zeckhauser, R. (1987). Status quo bias in decision making. *Journal of Risk and Uncertainty*, 1, 7–59.
Sarnoff, I. (1951). Identification with the aggressor: Some personality correlates of anti-Semitism among Jews. *Journal of Personality*, 20, 199–218.
Saunders, J. (1972). Class, color, and prejudice. A Brazilian counterpoint. In E. Q. Campbell (Ed.), *Racial Tensions and National Identity*. Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press.
Schachter, S. & Singer, J. E. (1962). Cognitive, social and physiological determinants of emotional state. *Psychological Review*, 69, 379–399.
Schaff, A. (1984). The pragmatic function of stereotypes. *International Journal of the Sociology of Language*, 45, 89–100.
Schlenker, B. R. (1980). *Impression Management: The Self-Concept, Social Identity, and Interpersonal Relations*. Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole.
Schwarz, N. & Clore, G. L. (1988). How do I feel about it? Informational function of affective states. In K. Fiedler & J. Forgas (Eds), *Affect, Cognition, and Social Behavior*. Toronto: Hogrefe International.
Scott, M. B. & Lyman, S. (1968). Accounts. *American Sociological Review*, 33, 46–62.
Scully, D. & Marolla, J. (1984). Convicted rapists' vocabulary of motive: Excuses and justifications. *Social Problems*, 31, 530–544.

Shavitt, S. (1989). Operationalizing functional theories of attitude. In A. R. Pratkanis, S. J. Breckler & A. G. Greenwald (Eds), *Attitude Structure and Function*. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Sherif, M. & Cantril, H. (1947/1966). *The Psychology of Ego-involvements*. New York: Wiley.
Sherif, M., & Sherif, C. W. (1956). *An Outline of Social Psychology*. New York: Harper.
Sidanius, J. (1993). The psychology of group conflict and the dynamics of oppression: A social dominance perspective. In S. Iyengar & W. J. McGuire (Eds), *Explorations in Political Psychology*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
Sidanius, J. & Pratto, F. (1993). The inevitability of oppression and the dynamics of social dominance. In P. Sniderman & P. E. Tetlock (Eds), *Prejudice, Politics, and the American Dilemma*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Skrypnek, B. J. & Snyder, M. (1982). On the self-perpetuating nature of stereotypes about women and men. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 18, 277–291.
Smedley, J. W. & Bayton, J. A. (1978). Evaluative race-class stereotypes by race and perceived class of subjects. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 36, 530–535.
Smith, M. B., Bruner, J. S. & White, R. W. (1956/1964). *Opinions and Personality*. New York: Wiley.
Snyder, M. (1981). On the self-perpetuating nature of social stereotypes. In D. L. Hamilton (Ed.), *Cognitive Processes in Stereotyping and Intergroup Behavior*. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Snyder, M. & DeBono, K. G. (1989). Understanding the functions of attitudes: Lessons from personality and social behavior. In A. R. Pratkanis, S. J. Breckler & A. G. Greenwald (Eds), *Attitude Structure and Function*. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Snyder, M. & Miene, P. (1994). On the functions of stereotypes and prejudice. In M. P. Zanna & J. M. Olson (Eds), *The Psychology of Prejudice/The Ontario Symposium*, vol. 7. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Spears, R. & Manstead, A. S. R. (1989). The social context of stereotyping and differentiation. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 19, 101–121.
Spence, J. T., Helmreich, R. L. & Holahan, C. K. (1979). Negative and positive components of psychological masculinity and femininity and their relationships to self-reports of neurotic and acting out behaviors. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 37, 1673–1682.
Staub, E. (1989). *The Roots of Evil: The Origins of Genocide and other Group Violence*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Steele, C. M. (1988). The psychology of self-affirmation: Sustaining the integrity of the self. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology*, vol. 21. New York: Academic Press.
Steele, C. M. (1992). Race and the schooling of black Americans. *The Atlantic Monthly*, April, 68–78.
Stephan, W. G. (1985). Intergroup relations. In G. Lindzey & E. Aronson (Eds), *The Handbook of Social Psychology*, vol. 2. New York: Random House.
Stotland, E. (1959). Peer groups and reactions to power figures. In D. Cartwright (Ed.), *Studies in Social Power*. Ann Arbor, MI: Institute for Social Research.
Struch, N. & Schwartz, S. H. (1989). Intergroup aggression: Its predictors and distinctness from in-group bias. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 56, 364–373.
Suls, J. & Wills, T. A. (1991). *Social Comparison: Contemporary Theory and Research*. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Sunar, D. (1978). Stereotypes of the powerless: A social psychological analysis. *Psychological Reports*, 43, 511–528.
Swann, W. B. (1983). Self-verification: Bringing social reality into harmony with the self. In J. Suls & A. G. Greenwald (Eds), *Psychological Perspectives on the Self*, vol. 2. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Sykes, G. M. & Matza, D. (1957). Techniques of neutralization. *American Sociological Review*, 22, 664–670.
Tajfel, H. (1970). Aspects of national and ethnic loyalty. *Social Science Information*, 9, 119–144.
Tajfel, H. (1978). *Differentiation Between Social Groups*. London: Academic Press.
Tajfel, H. (1981*a*). *Human Groups and Social Categories*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Tajfel, H. (1981*b*). Social stereotypes and social groups. In J. C. Turner & H. Giles (Eds), *Intergroup Behaviour*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Tajfel, H. (1982). Social psychology of intergroup relations. *Annual Review of Psychology*, 33, 1–39.
Tajfel, H. & Turner, J. C. (1979). An integrative theory of intergroup conflict. In W. G. Austin & S. Worchel (Eds), *The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations*. Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole.
Tajfel, H. & Turner, J. C. (1986). The social identity theory of intergroup behavior. In S. Worchel & W. G. Austin (Eds), *The Psychology of Intergroup Relations*. Chicago: Nelson-Hall.

Tetlock, P. E. (1992). The impact of accountability on judgement and choice: Toward a social contingency model. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology*, vol. 25. New York: Academic Press.
Triandis, H. C. (1977). *Interpersonal Behavior*. Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole.
Triandis, H. C., Lisansky, J., Setiadi, B., Chang, B., Marin, G. & Betancourt, H. (1982). Stereotyping among Hispanics and Anglos: The uniformity, intensity, direction, and quality of auto- and heterostereotypes. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, 13, 409–426.
Turner, J. C. (1975). Social comparison and social identity: Some prospects for intergroup behaviour. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 5, 5–34.
Turner, J. C. & Brown, R. (1978). Social status, cognitive alternatives, and intergroup relations. In H. Tajfel (Ed.), *Differentiation Between Social Groups*. London: Academic Press.
Turner, J. C., Hogg, M. A., Oakes, P. J., Reicher, S. & Wetherell, M. S. (1987). *Re-discovering the Social Group: A Self-categorization Theory*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Turner, J. C., Oakes, P. J., Haslam, S. A. & McGarty, C. (1992). Personal and social identity: Self and social context. Paper presented at the conference on 'The self and the collective', Princeton University.
Tversky, A. & Kahneman, D. (1974). Judgement under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases. *Science*, 185, 1124–1131.
Tyler, T. R. (1990). *Why People Obey the Law*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Tyler, T. R. & McGraw, K. M. (1986). Ideology and the interpretation of personal experience: Procedural justice and political quiescence. *Journal of Social Issues*, 42, 115–128.
van Knippenberg, A. (1978). Status differences, comparative relevance and intergroup differentiation. In H. Tajfel (Ed.), *Differentiation Between Social Groups*. London: Academic Press.
van Knippenberg, A. (1984). Intergroup differences in group perceptions. In H. Tajfel (Ed.), *The Social Dimension*, vol. 2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Vaughan, G. M. (1978). Social change and intergroup preferences in New Zealand. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 8, 297–314.
Wagner, U., Lampen, L. & Syllwasschy, J. (1986). In-group inferiority, social identity, and out-group devaluation in a modified minimal group study. *British Journal of Social Psychology*, 25, 15–23.
Ward, C. (1985). Sex trait stereotypes in Malaysian children. *Sex Roles*, 12, 35–45.
Wicklund, R. A. & Brehm, J. W. (1976). *Perspectives on Cognitive Dissonance*. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Widiger, T. A. & Settle, S. A. (1987). Broverman *et al.* revisited: An artifactual sex bias. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 53, 463–469.
Wilder, D. A. (1986). Social categorization: Implications for creation and reduction of intergroup bias. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology*, vol. 19. New York: Academic Press.
Willhelm, S. M. (1980). Can Marxism explain America's racism? *Social Problems*, 28, 98–112.
Williams, J. E. & Best, D. L. (1982). *Measuring Sex Stereotypes: A Thirty-nation Study*. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
Williams, J. E. & Morland, J. K. (1979). Comment on Bank's 'white preference in blacks: A paradigm in search of a phenomenon'. *Psychological Bulletin*, 86, 28–32.
Wood, A. W. (1988). Ideology, false consciousness, and social illusion. In B. P. McLaughlin & A. O. Rorty (Eds), *Perspectives on Self-Deception*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Worchel, S. & Austin, W. G. (1986). *The Psychology of Intergroup Relations*. Chicago: Nelson-Hall.
Word, C. O., Zanna, M. P. & Cooper, J. (1974). The nonverbal mediation of self-fulfilling prophecies in interracial interaction. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 10, 109–120.
Wortman, C. B. (1976). Causal attributions and personal control. In J. H. Harvey, W. J. Ickes & R. F. Kidd (Eds), *New Directions in Attribution Research*, vol. 2. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Zanna, M. P. & Rempel, J. K. (1988). Attitudes: A new look at an old concept. In D. Bar-Tal & A. W. Kruglanski (Eds), *The Social Psychology of Knowledge*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Zillman, D. (1978). Attribution and misattribution of excitatory reactions. In J. H. Harvey, W. J. Ickes & R. F. Kidd (Eds), *New Directions in Attribution Research*, vol. 2. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.